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BOOK REVIEW
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION By J. Thomas
McCarthy. Rochester, New York: Lawyers Co-Operative
Publishing Co., (2d ed. 1984). Pp. 2269, including Index,
Table of Cases, Table of Statutory Citations, Table of
Figures, Table of Forms, and Appendices.
Review by Kenneth B. Germain*
Eleven years passed between editions of Professor J. Thomas McCarthy's
comprehensive, two-volume treatise on trademark law and related aspects of
unfair competition.' During that interim period, a time of major expansion
of relevant legal doctrines,2 Professor McCarthy was active in his profes-
sional role per se, teaching at "home" (University of San Francisco) and
"away" (University of California at Berkeley [Boalt Hall], University of Cal-
ifornia at Davis). In addition to his participation in trademark/unfair com-
petition and civil procedure areas, he focused upon antitrust law and
copyright law. He also remained active in the practical sphere, serving as
"counsel" to law firms, advisor to legal associations, and lecturer at seminars
and mini-courses. Moreover, he stayed active as a scholar-author, branching
out into the antitrust law area.3 All of these experiences apparently pro-
vided meaningful cross-fertilization and maturation.
Eleven years also have passed since this reviewer committed his thoughts
about Professor McCarthy's first edition to writing.4 During this interim
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B., Rutgers College
1966; J.D., New York University 1969. Author of The Thirty-Fourth Year of Administration
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 285 (1982); The Thirty-Fifth
Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 559
(1982); The Thirty-Sixth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 73
TRADE-MARK REP. 577 (1983) (with Steven M. Weinberg). © 1985 Kenneth Germain.
1. J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as TRADEMARKS 1984]; J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
(1973).
2. See McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law During
the Decade of the 1970's, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 93 (1981).
3. See S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW (4th
ed. 1981).
4. Germain, Book Review, 61 KY. L.J. 931 (1973).
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period, this reviewer has had numerous opportunities to use the first edition,
in teaching, research, seminar presentation, and in practice. Thus, use of
the first edition, along with post first edition entries5 to the field-notably
Jerome Gilson's fine treatise published in 1974 6 -put this reviewer in a good
position to appraise the second edition.
A glance at Professor McCarthy's second edition informs the reader that
it is a comprehensive, carefully-documented, well-organized work. Exami-
nation of the treatise shows that the tone is generally rather neutral, albeit
obviously reflecting the views of one who believes in the legitimacy of the
trademark system; this is quite appropriate for a professor-lawyer such as
Professor McCarthy. The organizational structure is clear and helpful, and,
in fact, a bit better than the first edition because of the addition of extra
subsections to the already sound thirty-three chapter (with subchapters, sec-
tions, and subsections) format. The illustrations and charts dotting the text
are quite welcome and go beyond those earlier available. The depth of the
authorities cited in the footnotes, notably such secondary literature as law
review articles, is improved.7 While especially good reference is made to
many useful pieces published in The Trade-Mark Reporter, an odd omission
is the series of "Annual Review" articles written since the effective date of
the Lanham Act' by the late Professor Walter Derenberg for twenty-five
years and continued to the present by others (most recently, this reviewer
and a collaborator).9 References to these "Annual Reviews" from time to
5. Two of the preexisting treatises have not been revised since 1973. E. VANDENBURGH
II, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1968); A. SEIDEL, S. DUBROFF & E. GONDA,
TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE (1963). The other preexisting treatise has undergone a
major revision by a successor to its late originator. See R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES (4th ed. 1981). This later multi-volume work, though
prodigious and encyclopedic (including "unfair competition" in its broadest sense plus the law
of monopolies), still suffers from a very old-fashioned orientation, weak organization (inter-
mingling of too many disparate sources of law), unclear writing, and a peculiar format of
separation of text and "foot" notes. It may be worth consulting for its voluminous coverage,
but it is not an apt educational resource.
6. J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE (1974), reviewed by W.M.
Webner, in 61 A.B.A. J. 426 (1975). This treatise, comprised of one text-and-footnote volume
of approximately 800 pages plus one appendix volume, is neither as extensive nor as intensive
in its coverage as Professor McCarthy's almost 2000-page-plus-appendices work.
7. Useful citations to the publisher's Total Client-Service Library References are also pro-
vided at the beginning of each chapter. Also, citations to secondary sources properly-and
helpfully-include the precise pages of interest, whether or not a passage is being quoted, an
improvement over the first edition.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Derenberg, The First Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act
of 1946, 38 TRADE-MARK REP. 831 (1948); Derenberg, The Twenty-Fifth Year of Administra-
tion of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 62 TRADE-MARK REP. 393 (1972); Germain, The
Thirty-Fourth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 71 TRADE-
[Vol. 34:595
Book Review
time, particularly with regard to cases of major consequence, would have
complemented the coverage existing in the treatise. Where the treatise is not
deep enough or perhaps not critical enough, the Annual Review commenta-
tor sometimes has been able to shed additional light.'°
Before launching into some substantive comments on the second edition, a
few somewhat technical matters should be mentioned. First, the new edition
consists of two volumes of approximately the same size as those in the origi-
nal edition. The additional bulk of cases and commentary-undoubtedly
necessary due to the explosion of relevant legal principles-is accommo-
dated by lighter weight, slightly less opaque (and thus less visually comforta-
ble) paper; the print is still dark, decent-sized, and readable. The appendices
include a copy of the Lanham Act with useful up-to-date notes on legislative
changes,'1 and a compendium of other statutes relating to trademarks. This
compendium is helpfully trichotomized (direct trademark statutes, other
statutes regarding trademarks, relevant portions of patent statutes); the first
part is organized alphabetically by the name of the "beneficiary" of the spe-
cial legislation. 2 Also included are an updated copy of "Trademark Rules
of Practice," with an index,' 3 and a table of citations in the treatise to vari-
ous sections of the Lanham Act. On the downside, however, the Table of
Cases is still by section number only (rather than page number) and the
overall index no longer even includes subsection numbers (as the first edition
did).
The crux of this review-now overdue-is a run-down of substantive
highlights of the second edition. Some obviously are more significant than
others; the more significant will be summarized and critiqued, whereas the
less significant will merely be mentioned.
Near the beginning of the treatise is a section1 4 that serves as a good
scene-setter for the entire work. This section lists some of the developments
(since the first edition) that signal the major growth and shrinkage in the
overall area of unfair competition. Referenced here are the United States
MARK REP. 285 (1981); Germain & Weinberg, The Thirty-Sixth Year of Administration of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 577 (1983).
10. Compare the reviewed treatise's treatment of the famous (infamous?) Anti-Monopoly
H case (Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 216 U.S.P.Q.
588 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983)) in §§ 12.2, 12.3, 12.11, 12.15 with the
reviewer's handling of it in Germain & Weinberg, supra note 9, at 683-86. Also compare the
reviewed treatise's dispersed treatment of the interesting Jaycees case (United States Jaycees v.
Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 209 U.S.P.Q. 457 (3d Cir. 1981)) with Germain, supra
note 9, at 370-74.
11. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at app. A:1.
12. Id. at app. A:2.
13. Id. at app. A:3 (reproducing 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-2.6, 2.1-2.189 (1983)).
14. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1.
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Supreme Court's retrenchment' 5 from the severe "Sears-Compco" doc-
trine," the prodigious expansion of Lanham Act section 43(a) on a few
fronts (false advertising, trademark protection, product simulation), the
emergence of "reverse confusion" as a discrete theory,' 7 and the recognition
and definition of the right of publicity." s Also, near the beginning of the
treatise are various sections that indicate that the tone will be "neutral" 9
and that trademark/unfair competition law will be treated as an integral
part of the greater law of intellectual property2° and trade regulation,2" a
matter for which Professor McCarthy's training and experience ably pre-
pared him.
"Functionality" is a topic that Professor McCarthy takes on very effec-
tively. In particular, he undertakes to clarify the distinction between two
subspecies of "functionality," utilitarian and aesthetic. With regard to the
first of these, the leading recent case from the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (now the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) is empha-
sized 22-without some of its confusing semantic terminology ("de facto" and
"de jure" functionality). Regarding the second of these, the progeny of Pag-
liero,23 including the sensible Vuitton decision," are clearly discussed. A
15. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 201 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1979); Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 205 U.S.P.Q. 741 (1977); Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
178 U.S.P.Q. 129 (1973).
16. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 140 U.S.P.Q. 524 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 140 U.S.P.Q. 528 (1964).
17. See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219, 189
U.S.P.Q. 17 (D. Colo.), affd and modified, 561 F.2d 1365, 195 U.S.P.Q. 417 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
18. This topic is nicely covered in § 10:21, which has double the coverage of the first
edition.
19. See, e.g., TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 2:14 (the unemotional views
presented on the oft-emotional issue of "irrational advertising"). In particular, see the "Au-
thor's Comment." Id. § 2:14, at 101-02.
20. For example, § 6:4 accommodates the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810
(1982), and § 6:5A contains a considerably expanded discussion of the copyright/trademark
interface regarding labels and slogans. Moreover, a series of useful reminders that the term
"public domain" means different things in different contexts is provided. TRADEMARKS 1984,
supra note 1, at 148, 156, 170, 356.
21. Expanded treatments of the trademark/antitrust interface are seen in §§ 1:16, 2:1,
2:5C.
22. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, § 7:26C (discussing In re Morton-Norwich Prod-
ucts, 671 F.2d 1332, 213 U.S.P.Q. 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
23. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343, 95 U.S.P.Q. 45 (9th Cir. 1952) ("If
the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the
interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright.").
24. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, 644 F.2d 769, 210 U.S.P.Q. 351 (9th Cir.
1981).
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closing "Author's Comment" 25-one of many excellent perspective pieces
dotting the treatise's landscape-makes the interesting argument that "aes-
thetic functionality" is an unnecessary doctrine because the less controver-
sial doctrine of ornamentality is sufficient to weed out nondesignative terms.
A brief follow-up "Comment" reminds the reader that in certain "hard
cases," that is, situations in which a commonplace phrase like "apply hook
to wall" are involved, such phrases are denied trademark or copyright law
protection because they lack sufficient originality or creativity.
26
In the chapter on "distinctiveness," there is a very good discussion of the
difference between "deceptiveness" under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
and "deceptive misdescriptiveness" under section 2(e) of that Act. 27 The
author notes that this difference is significant because section 2(e) marks are
salvageable via secondary meaning "distinctiveness" under Lanham Act sec-
tion 2(f),28 whereas section 2(a) marks are flatly barred from registration; he
further notes that the pivotal question is the materiality of the deceptive
suggestion, thereby adopting a position taken by this reviewer some years
ago.29 (After the second edition went to press, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board formally adopted this position with regard to "geographically
deceptively misdescriptive" marks.) 30
The chapter on "acquisition and priority" of trademarks contains a help-
ful subchapter on "ownership." The chapter's first section,3" concerning
who, within such pairings as individual and corporation, parent and subsidi-
ary, and landlord and tenant, owns the trademark used by one of the mem-
bers of each pair, is nicely expanded from the first edition. Another
section32 contains a very useful discussion of the peculiar concept of joint
ownership of a trademark-by usual definition a designation of a single
source. Professor McCarthy's analysis, and conclusion-"such problems
can only be dealt with adequately by giving weight to customer perception
25. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, § 7:26E.
26. Id. § 7:26F.
27. See id. § I1:19A, discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1052(e) (1982).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1982).
29. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at 486 (citing Germain, Trademark Registration
Under Sections 2(a) and 2(e) of the Lanham Act: The Deception Decision, 44 FORDHAM L.
REV. 249 (1975), 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 97 (1976)).
30. In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (BAHIA for cigars
not emanating from the famed Bahia area of Brazil "deceptive"). Cf Evans Prod. Co. v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q. 160 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (basically adopting the materiality test for
nongeographically deceptively misdescriptive marks).
31. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 16:13.
32. Id. § 16:14 (admittedly adapted from McCarthy, Joint Ownership of a Trademark, 73
TRADE-MARK REP. 1 (1983)).
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and the identification of source and quality policies of trademark law'"33 -
are far superior to the counterproductive view recently taken by a majority
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, suggesting that two unrelated
parties could have protectable rights in the identical mark for the identical
goods in the same market.34
Chapter eighteen, on licensing/franchising, constitutes a major improve-
ment in Professor McCarthy's treatise. It contains very good sections on the
rules regarding trademarks in modern licensing,35 the meaning of "related
company" under Lanham Act sections 5 and 45,36 a summary of special
rules applicable to franchise investments, 37 and a good discussion of the sig-
nificant area of franchisors' liability for the torts of their franchisees.38
These are matters of great modern commercial significance, and it is a real
plus for the second edition to do such a complete job of dealing with them.
Chapter nineteen provides an exhaustive treatment of federal registration
(other than "inter partes" proceedings). Of special interest is its careful cov-
erage of the broadened concept of "use in commerce" of trademarks under
the Silenus case39 and its handling of the controversial matter of "token
use," both for initial application and later registration maintenance pur-
poses." (Unfortunately, two interesting decisions of the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board interpreting very narrowly "token use" regarding initial
use were decided too recently for inclusion in the text.)41
Volume two of the revised treatise contains a nicely expanded chapter on
likelihood of confusion, the very heart of trademark infringement (and also
of confusing similarity determinations under section 2(d) in registration pro-
ceedings). This chapter starts with the pivotal question "Whose Confusion
and About What?' 4 2 This, of course, focuses attention on the matter of
confusion of customers (usually) about the source of manufacture or distri-
33. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 16:14E, at 757.
34. Wallpaper Mfrs. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 214 U.S.P.Q. 327
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
35. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 18:14.
36. Id. § 18:16B (interpreting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1982)).
37. Id. § 18:23.
38. Id. § 18:24.
39. Id. § 19:37A, at 964 (discussing In re Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d 806, 192 U.S.P.Q.
261 (C.C.P.A. 1977)). See id. § 19:38.
40. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, §§ 19:37B-:37D, 19:37G.
41. On-Cor Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. 567 (T.T.A.B. 1983)
(application void ab initio because the registered mark was used before the filing date only on a
product different from the final product actually intended to be sold under that mark); Miles
Laboratories v. Int'l Diagnostic Technology, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 438 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (similar
ruling as On-Cor). But cf Pennwalt Corp. v. Sentry Chem. Co., 219 U.S.P.Q. 542 (T.T.A.B.
1983) (unusually liberal view of experimental first use).
42. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 23:1D.
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bution of the marked goods or services. A new subsection on "reverse con-
fusion" fol.ows. 43 An excellent treatment of whether the determination of
the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion is a question of law (and thus
fully reviewable on appeal) or of fact (and thus subject to the "clearly erro-
neous" rule of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)) also appears.'
Matters concerning the territorial effect of trademarks are covered exten-
sively in chapter twenty-six of the treatise. Of particular note are the ex-
panded treatment of "good faith" in relation to a junior user's claim of
"remote" territory (both at common law and under the constructive notice
resulting under section 22 of the Lanham Act)45 and the substantially re-
written, insightful explication and analysis of the respective roles of Lanham
Act sections 33(b), 33(a), 15 and 43(a).46
The all-important, fast developing scope of Lanham Act section 43(a), the
Act's so-called "unfair competition" provision,47 as a weapon against false
advertising is covered in a chapter that is substantially revamped from the
first edition. Introductory sections highlighting the precedence of section 44
as a matter of legislative history48 and the expansion of section 43(a) into the
trademark infringement arena49 are well done in general, albeit perhaps too
accepting of judge-made doctrine without enough statutory scrutiny.
Some of the second edition's most significant modifications show up in its
remedies chapters. Three areas are of special noteworthiness: laches, fraud
on the Patent and Trademark Office, and commercial speech.
As to laches, Professor McCarthy provides a solid historical background,
rooted in early major cases of the United States Supreme Court5" followed
by explanations of the philosophy of the laches doctrine, especially as it re-
lates to injunctive and monetary remedies individually.51 A distinction is
drawn between "laches" (unreasonable delay per se) and "estoppel by
laches" (judicial refusal to enforce certain "rights" because of "laches" and
resulting prejudice to the defendant).52 This distinction, new to the second
43. Id. § 23:1E. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
44. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 23:22.
45. Id. §§ 26:3-26:4.
46. Id. §§ 26:18-26:19.
47. Professor McCarthy warns his readers that "[section] 43(a) is not totally synonymous
with the whole law of unfair competition." Id. § 1:9, at 24 n.20 (citing Germain, Unfair Trade
Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. You've Come a Long Way, Baby--Too Far,
Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973), 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 193 (1974)).
48. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 27:2.
49. Id. § 27:3.
50. Id. § 31:3A (discussing, inter alia, McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878); Menendez
v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888)).
51. See TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at §§ 31:3B-:3C, 31:4.
52. Id. § 31:2.
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edition, is of major usefulness and deserves to be noted by all persons inter-
ested in trademark infringement remedies. Also of note is Professor McCar-
thy's definition of "laches by acquiescence" (creation of complacency by
something more than mere nonobjection to another's use of a mark).53
As to fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, Professor McCarthy
provides some interesting introductory perspectives on why so many liti-
gants plead such an often unsuccessful theory.54 He then describes the ele-
ments of a prima facie case of "fraud"" and meaningfully categorizes the
types of "fraud" that are possible: failure to disclose information regarding
nondistinctiveness; signing of the ownership oath when there is some ques-
tion of the applicant's exclusive ownership of the mark; misstatement of the
date of first use; failure to disclose others' uses of the mark; fraud regarding
filings under sections 8, 9, and 15.56 Along the way, one overly restrictive
case was properly criticized57 while another case of undisciplined nature was
accepted without disapproval.5 8 Oddly, an important recent decision by the
Federal Circuit was relegated to a footnote.59
On the commercial speech doctrine, the second edition's coverage is en-
tirely new because the doctrine, especially as it relates to trademark law, is of
recent origin. Here, the foundational cases are cited and discussed. 6' The
wisdom of another commentator, that the first amendment is not likely to
have any substantial effect on typical trademark infringement suits because
the likelihood of confusion requirement necessarily imports an element of
regulable deception, is also applauded.61 Professor McCarthy makes an in-
teresting suggestion that "purely communicative, non-trademark setting"
uses of a firm's marks for such purposes as critical comment upon a com-
pany's policies should be permitted. He also draws an interesting analogy
between the first amendment in relation to trademark matters, on the one
53. Id. § 31:14.
54. Id. § 31:21.
55. Id. § 31:21B.
56. Id. § 31:21C.
57. See id. § 31:21C, at 616 (discussing Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 216
U.S.P.Q. 1061 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982)).
58. See TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 31:21C, at 613 (discussing Money Store v.
Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 216 U.S.P.Q. 11 (7th Cir. 1982)).
59. See TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 31:21C, at 613 n.9 (citing Rosso & Mas-
tracco, Inc. v. Giant Food, Inc., 720 F.2d 1263, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
60. See TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at § 31:37 (discussing, inter alia, Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
61. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, at 663 (citing Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols,
1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 165).
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hand, and the doctrine of "fair use" in copyright law, on the other.62 The
subchapter is wrapped up with a treatment of the role of parody-another
copyright law analogue-in trademark cases, with Professor McCarthy tak-
ing a position that is anything but "protectionist.
63
Now that some of the highlights of Professor McCarthy's second edition
have been chronicled it remains only to reiterate that in the opinion of this
reviewer it is a very fine treatise indeed. It is highly recommended to all-
practitioners, general or specialized, and academicians alike-interested in
the legal crazy quilt known as trademark/unfair competition law.
62. TRADEMARKS 1984, supra note 1, § 31:37, at 666-67.
63. Professor McCarthy noted:
No one likes to be the butt of a joke, not even a trademark. But the requirement of
trademark law is that a likely confusion of source, sponsorship or affiliation must be
proven, which is not the same thing as a 'right' not to be made fun of.
Id. § 31:38, at 670.
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